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The debate over the legitimacy and appropriate scope of judicial review
has not cooled. John Hart Ely's influential Democracy and Distrust' has
apparently become an opening shot in another battle between proponents
of activism and restraint, rather than the final volley the author might
have desired.' Theories outlining the proper measure of judicial authority
abound, as do critiques of such theories. Nonetheless, two current books,
Philip Bobbitt's Constitutional Fate3 and Michael Perry's The Constitu-
tion, the Courts, and Human Rights4 are welcome additions to the in-
creasingly crowded literature of judicial review. Both books are powerful
studies that not only examine the shortcomings of judicial review in a
democratic society, but refreshingly explore the potential values of consti-
tutional decisionmaking as well.
The tensions that arise between judicial review and democratic theory
are easily described. When the federal judiciary negates an action of a
legislature or member of the executive branch, electorally accountable in-
stitutions are overridden by electorally unaccountable judges. If one ac-
cepts the premise that important governmental decisions in a representa-
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Mary.
1. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisRmusT (1980).
2. See Fleming, A Critique ofJohn Hart Ely's Quest for the Ultimate Constitutional Interpretiv-
ism of Representative Democracy (Book Review), 80 Micii. L. REv. 634, 635 (1982).
3. P. BOBBITT, CONsTrrTIONAL FATE (1982) [hereinafter cited by author and page number
only].
4. M. PERRY, THE CoNsTrrrrxON, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982) [hereinafter
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tive democracy are to be made by elected representatives, broad judicial
authority is disconcerting from the outset.
For the modern American citizen, however, the problem is more than
theoretical. Despite the many ways in which some see our government as
less than truly representative, American voters cling stubbornly to the be-
lief that they can show their displeasure with the performance of govern-
ment officials by voting errant officials out of office. With the federal judi-
ciary, however, citizens are not even allowed this traditional prerogative.
Not only are constitutional decisions made by judges who cannot be re-
moved through the ballot, but the rulings are particularly irksome to over-
turn. Amending the Constitution is a slow and cumbersome process, and
the congressional authority to regulate the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court is problematic and rarely used.5
Of course some constitutional decisions present greater difficulties than
others. On those rare occasions when a ruling is based upon an unambig-
uous and widely shared interpretation of the constitutional text, the ten-
sion between judicial review and electoral democracy is minimal. The
Court can tell democratic enthusiasts that it is merely enforcing long-
standing mutual promises made by the nation as a whole, not by the judi-
ciary. A decision, for example, that prohibits governmental classifications
based on race seems not only justified by the language and history of the
equal protection clause but also grounded in an expressed consensus of
constitutional values that mitigates any danger of judicial usurpation of
legislative power.'
Decisions based upon the clear mandates of the constitutional text,
however, are rare. Far more often, courts base their rulings on values
other than those unambiguously constitutionalized by the framers. Stat-
utes are invalidated because they infringe an asserted right to privacy,, to
freedom from gender discrimination,8 or to any of a number of judicially
recognized "rights"'9 clearly beyond the contemplation of the framers. Ad-
vocates of such noninterpretive review argue that the courts should go be-
yond the references contained in the constitutional text "and enforce
norms that cannot be discovered within the four corners of the
document."10
Since it is anchored in judicially created values, noninterpretive review
conflicts with democratic principles: Rights discovered by judges appear to
5. See infra note 82.
6. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S.
303 (1880).
7. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
8. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
9. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
10. J. ELY, supra note 1, at 1.
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prevail over conflicting interests asserted by more representative institu-
tions. This perception of conflict, fueled by public antagonism to modern
noninterpretive decisions like Engel v. Vitale,11 Roe v. Wade,12 and
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,3 has sparked a
barrage of claims and counterclaims about the legitimacy of judicial
review.
The responses pressed by theorists to the counter-majoritarian difficul-
ties of noninterpretive review have run the gamut. Proponents of restraint,
such as Berger,"' Bork,1 5 and Rehnquist,"6 argue that the Court may void
the actions of other branches of government only on the basis of values
constitutionalized by the framers. Activists like Tribe17 and Fiss 8 seek
broad judicial implementation of values unbounded by the language of the
text to assure greater protection of individual autonomy and equality. In
Democracy and Distrust, John Hart Ely stakes out a middle ground, ad-
vocating judicial scrutiny of the political process but disclaiming similar
judicial authority over its substantive outcomes."
Bobbitt and Perry enter this debate as strong proponents of noninter-
pretive review. Although their books differ in tone and emphasis, Consti-
tutional Fate and The Constitution, the Courts, and Human Rights have
similar jurisprudential missions. Both run counter to the current trend in
constitutional scholarship, which attempts to narrow the focus and func-
tion of judicial review. Both propose to replace narrow review with a non-
textual analysis to implement an evolving consensus of constitutional val-
ues-a method of adjudication that Henry Monaghan derides as no more
than asking, "Is that what America stands for?"' Bobbitt and Perry,
however, apparently see America's constitutional "stand" as a matter of
no small import. Their works reflect the belief that the United States Su-
preme Court should be an active participant in our continuing effort to
mold a more just society.
11. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
12. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
13. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
14. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977).
15. Bork, The Inpossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979 WAs. U.L.Q.
695.
16. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TERx. L. REV. 693 (1976). Justice Rehn-
quist's actions on occasion lead one to question his commitment to his theory. See Industrial Union
Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 681-82 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); Na-
tional League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
17. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1977).
18. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms ofJustice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1979).
19. J. ELY, supra note 1.
20. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 396 (1981).
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The next two sections of this review examine the visions of judicial
authority and competence presented in each of the two works. The final
section takes a broader look at the significance of these arguments in the
context of recent efforts to define the role of the federal judiciary in our
constitutional system.
I. Constitutional Fate
Philip Bobbitt's Constitutional Fate is a subtle examination of the legit-
imacy of judicial review. Unlike most analyses of the subject, the work
adopts no overarching principle as its justification for judicial authority.
Rather, Bobbitt offers a typology of constitutional arguments used to sup-
port judicial review. Bobbitt devotes separate chapters to historical, tex-
tual, doctrinal, prudential, structural, and what he describes as "ethical"
constitutional argument. Yet these theories are characterized not as a pri-
ori logical justifications for constitutional review, but as accepted conven-
tions in a continuing dialogue on the appropriate scope of judicial
authority.
This perspective, in turn, arises from a larger understanding concerning
the purposes of legal argument. Legal argument, in Bobbitt's view, cannot
establish independent legitimacy for judicial review because its debates
and analyses reflect a pre-existing commitment to such legitimacy.21 Yet
legal argument nonetheless plays a central role in the process of legitima-
tion. Through the formulation and development of the conventions of legal
arguments, and their communication to legal experts and laymen alike,
the authority of the Court is vindicated in the eyes of the American peo-
ple. Bobbitt explains:
[T]he Constitution is a sort of self-excited circuit. As it is applied in
the courts, among other places, it gives rise to observer-participancy.
Ask any American adolescent what to look for to determine whether
a society is just, and he or she will answer, sooner or later, with
conceptions drawn from the applications of the Bill of Rights.
Judges, litigants, journalists and juries are responsible for what they
often believe themselves merely to be witnessing. Out of the chance
collisions of interests, random acts of observer-participancy arise.22
To illustrate the development of these conventions of legal argument,
Bobbitt employs an imaginative technique. He focuses not on abstract ju-
risprudential theories, but on the responses of paradigmatic spokesmen to
salient events in recent constitutional history. The language of Justice
Black brings textual argument into focus. Henry Hart supplies the voice
21. P. BoaBrrr at 5.
22. Id. at 240.
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for doctrinal argument; Alexander Bickel speaks for prudential argument;
Charles Black epitomizes the use of structural constitutional argument.
Bobbitt's emphasis on constitutional players not only lends credence to his
notion of observer-participancy, but makes the book quite readable.
A major portion of Constitutional Fate is devoted to the development of
a distinct category of constitutional argument that Bobbitt calls "ethical
argument." He describes this method of analysis as
constitutional argument whose force relies on a characterization of
American institutions and the role within them of the American peo-
ple. It is the character, or ethos of the American polity that is ad-
vanced . . . as the source from which particular decisions derive."3
The term "ethical argument," therefore, is employed because of its etymo-
logical basis ("expressive of character") rather than for its connotations of
moral argument.2 '
Although ethical argument sounds like substantive due process revis-
ited-and though Bobbitt's principal examples of accepted ethical argu-
ments are substantive due process cases like Griswold v. Connecticut,25
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 6 and Moore v. City of East Cleveland 2 -the two
concepts are analytically dissimilar. Substantive due process, at least as
applied by the federal courts, is a doctrine of rights. If the Court deter-
mines that a substantive right-typically the right to privacy-exists, that
right is treated as if expressly listed in the Bill of Rights. 28 The constitu-
tional inquiry turns, therefore, not on whether government has exercised a
power affirmatively allotted to it, but on whether a particular exercise of
conceded governmental power impermissibly intrudes upon some reservoir
of individual liberty.
Ethical arguments, however, "arise from the ethos of limited govern-
ment and the seam where powers end and rights begin. ' 2'9 The constitu-
23. Id. at 94.
24. Id. at 94-95. Bobbitt seeks to ground ethical argument in a constitutional ethos of limited
power rather than moral argument generally. To equate constitutional decisionmaking with moral
philosophy, he argues, runs contrary to our society's "considerable moral pluralism." Id. at 139. De-
spite the fact that ethical argument is an obviously open-ended concept, it does not ask whether partic-
ular government action is morally desirable. It instead has its foundation in our constitutional conven-
tions. As discussed infra at pp. 182-83, Perry mistakenly seeks to equate constitutional
decisionmaking with ethical argument.
25. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
26. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
27. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
28. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), for example, the Court determined that a
substantive right to privacy was implicated by state interference with intimate marital decisions. As a
result of the implication of a fundamental right, the legislation involved was subjected to strict
scrutiny.
29. P. BoBBr at 162.
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tional inquiry focuses on whether government-given its "limited" na-
ture-is empowered to employ the challenged means in the first place. In
the abortion cases, for example, questions of substantive due process re-
volve around judicial declarations of abortion as a fundamental right.
Once the Court determines abortion is such a right, the state must give
compelling justification for its intrusions upon that right or the statutes
must fall. Absent interference with a constitutionally significant individual
right, however, the analysis need not review the regulatory means em-
ployed by the state. Ethical argument, in contrast, measures the state's
means against the "ethos of limited government." If a state should not be
able to coerce private acts, then the statute falls. All exercises of govern-
ment power are therefore subject to review under the ethical analysis,
since any such exercise might violate the ethos of limited government.
Bobbitt considers Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins 0 to be an instance of
ethical decisionmaking, for example, because its rationale derives from the
limited nature of federal power.3 ' The dangers of potential judicial usur-
pation are increased by the breadth of ethical review, but ethical argument
does avoid the difficulty of deriving particular "fundamental" rights from
only the vaguest of constitutional mandates.
The method of deriving ethical arguments is itself somewhat obscure,
however. The ethos of limited federal power-which Bobbitt derives both
from the Bill of Rights and, with respect to state governments, from the
Civil War Amendments-is hardly precise guidance for difficult constitu-
tional questions. Bobbitt is nonetheless able to present some plausible ex-
amples. He argues that the text of the Fifth Amendment suggests a
"larger principle that government may not force defendants to assist in
their own condemnation, '3' and that the Fourth Amendment points to the
tenet that "privacy may only be infringed by government on a showing of
necessity." 3 Recalling Erie, Bobbitt also suggests that ethical argument
can derive directly from the limited nature of expressed powers.3 '
30. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
31. P. BOBBiTT at 169.
32. Id. at 150.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 196-219. Though it is not central to this essay's analysis, nor I think to Bobbitt's book,
Constitutional Fate also examines what Bobbitt terms an "expressive" function of judicial review.
Quoting Hans Linde, Bobbitt argues that constitutional rulings may help to "shape people's visions of
their Constitution and of themselves." Id. at 219 (quoting Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Realist
Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227, 238 (1972)). Viewed through the lens of such a function, cases like
Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), and United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683
(1974), appear more fully justified. Schemnpp, the radical prayer case, though often ignored, expressed
concretely the constitutional demand for removal of religious pursuits from the public schools. Simi-
larly, Nixon, for all its doctrinal difficulties, expresses our constitutional belief that the President is
not above the law. P. BOBrr at 196-217. Like ethical argument, the expressive function of judicial
review emphasizes the self-definitional aspects of constitutional decisionmaking.
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Because it is so clearly tied to shared American perceptions about the
Constitution, Bobbitt's portrait of judicial authority is attractive. Yet Con-
stitutional Fate is not without its shortcomings. Ethical argument may
begin from a different premise than its beleaguered cousin, substantive
due process, but the concept is every bit as unbounded in scope. Bobbitt's
examples of ethical principles like "government may not coerce intimate
acts"3 5 and may not "confine a person dangerous to neither himself nor to
others" 36 depend upon liberal use of judicial imagination. And though
Bobbitt's method can be distinguished from modern substantive due pro-
cess review, it is strikingly similar to that of cases like Lochner v. New
York 37 and Coppage v. Kansas.8 In striking down regulations that inter-
fered with the "free" market system, those cases employed "ethical" argu-
ments by characterizing such intrusions as inconsistent with the American
ethos of individual liberty. Bobbitt acknowledges as much by claiming that
these cases' "new use of the old concept of the police power" was in many
ways "a promising dialectical move."3 9 Bobbitt nonetheless criticizes the
Lochner line of cases as an abuse of constitutional review by a particular
political faction. Yet one could use Bobbitt's method to draw an equally
broad ethos of freedom of contract from the constitutional provisions pro-
tecting economic expectations, such as the contracts clause40 and the tak-
ings clause.4
By employing an "ethos of limited government" to construct meta-prin-
ciples of constitutional law, the federal judiciary could attain a substantial
breadth of interpretive leeway. A "states' rights" court might discover
principles of federalism in the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments that
would make National League of Cities v. Usery42 and Younger v. Har-
ris48 pale in comparison. A court motivated by principles of egalitarian-
ism, by contrast, could take its generalities from Article IV's guarantee of
a republican form of government, the privileges and immunities clause,
and other repositories of liberal philosophy. Further, Bobbitt uses the eth.-
ical principle that "government may not mutilate persons save in self-
defense"" to challenge the death penalty, though deriving such an argu-
ment flies in the face of the framers' intentions.
35. P. BOBBITT at 159.
36. Id. at 166.
37. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
38. 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
39. P. BOBBrIT at 148.
40. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1 provides in pertinent part: "No State shall. . . pass any...
Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts."
41. U.S. CONST. amend. V states in pertinent part: "[No] private property [shall] be taken for
public use, without just compensation."
42. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
43. 401 U.S. 37 (1970).
44. P. BOBBrrr at 156.
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Nor is the argument for applying ethical arguments to strike down the
actions of state governments entirely persuasive. An ethos of limited gov-
ernment is easy to ascribe to the federal government, which was intention-
ally framed with limited powers. But state governments, at least in theory,
possess plenary authority. Bobbitt nonetheless argues that an "ethos of
limited government" applies to the states as a result of the privileges and
immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."' If Bobbitt's privileges
and immunities claim were true, however, it would require the incorpora-
tion of the entire Bill of Rights. The first eight amendments are our most
formal, most incontrovertible examples of ethical restraints on govern-
ment. Yet complete incorporation has only rarely been endorsed by the
Supreme Court,48 and Bobbitt ignores the interplay between his privileges
and immunities argument and the incorporation doctrine.
Moreover, like any incorporationist, Bobbitt faces a strong interpretivist
hurdle. In the same way that it is difficult to believe that the term "due
process of law" is shorthand for "the Bill of Rights," it stretches credulity
to argue that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to empower the
judiciary to fashion "ethical" restraints on government through the privi-
leges and immunities clause.
Bobbitt therefore seeks to bolster his claim for ethical review of state
governments' decisionmaking with a juxtaposition of the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments.47 Because the two amendments speak of both individual and
state autonomy, one can infer an ethos of limited power enforceable
against local governments. Ethical argument, as a tool of constitutional
review, is nonetheless a tool for increasing the federal judicial power.
Whatever the Ninth and Tenth Amendments mean, it seems clear that
they were not intended to increase the federal government's power over
the states.
Despite its flaws, however, Constitutional Fate is an exceptional work.
Bobbitt's concept of ethical argument is appealing for several reasons.
First, it recognizes openly what most of us believe: There are truly some
activities which are beyond the power of government-whether state or
federal-even though they are not prohibited by the constitutional text.
Second, unlike process-based theories of review, ethical review refuses to
45. This argument takes into account, of course, that state governments are empowered to effectu-
ate different ends than is the federal government. P. BOBBrrr at 154-55.
46. The bulk of the guarantees contained in the Bill of Rights have been selectively incorporated
through the due process clause. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
375-78 (2d ed. 1983). Under Bobbitt's argument, however, the Court would be compelled to enforce
the entire Bill of Rights against the states "jot-for-jot," including, for example, the right to civil jury
trial and grand jury indictment. See Minneapolis & St. L. R.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916)
(trial by jury); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) (indictment by grand jury).
47. P. BoBBrrr at 152-54.
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countenance willingly the harm to our internalized constitutional ethos
that flows from prohibiting judicial protection of non-textual liberties.
Our present disdain for arguments that rely on characterizations of our
institutions and of ourselves leads us to accept invasions of personal auton-
omy inconsistent with widely shared ideas concerning what is properly the
government's business.
48
Finally, Constitutional Fate is a strong reminder that judicial review,
properly undertaken, can serve a variety of functions and guarantee a va-
riety of interests in modern society. It provides not simply a method of
assuring compliance with the constitutional text, balancing our govern-
mental structure, guaranteeing access to the political process, protecting
individual liberties, or defining ourselves as a society. It provides, rather,
all these things.
II. The Constitution, the Courts, and Human Rights
Michael Perry's book explores the propriety of constitutional poli-
cymaking in a more traditional manner; Perry sets out to vindicate
noninterpretive judicial review in "human rights" cases.' He systemati-
cally considers and discards a variety of theories of judicial power before
settling on his own "functional" justification for broad review in individ-
ual rights cases.
Like Jesse Choper and others, 50 Perry describes the protection of indi-
vidual liberties as the paramount role of the United States Supreme
Court.51 He sees no issues arising under the rubrics of federalism or sepa-
ration of powers that justify broad judicial authority in those fields.
52
Perry strongly defends noninterpretive review in individual rights cases in
a two-step argument. First, he assails Ely's distinction between review of
process-based and substance-based rights." Second, Perry offers an ener-
getic justification for judicial policymaking in all human rights cases,
based upon the value of expressing a national commitment to individual
rights and upon the consistency of such a practice with basic principles of
democratic accountability. Since this functional vindication is the major
thrust of the book, I will consider it in some detail.
48. See Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library, 439 U.S. 1052 (1978) (Marshall, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari).
49. M. PERRY at 37. Perry defines "human rights" as "the rights individuals have, or ought to
have, against government under the 'fundamental'--constitutional-law." Id. at 2.
50. See J. CHoPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980); Fiss,
supra note 18.
51. M. PERRY at 37.
52. Id. at 60; see J. CHOPER, supra note 50, at 175.
53. See J. ELY, supra note 1, at 73-77; M. PERRY at 21-24 (attacking Ely).
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Constitutional theorists have justified extratextual judicial review by
pointing to the structure of our government," American traditions,5" and
a supposed societal consensus of values. 6 Perry denies the existence of a
particular set of traditions or values which instruct judicial decisionmak-
ing.5" He instead identifies a fundamental feature of the American con-
sciousness that he calls "religious" 5S-connoting the existence of a "bind-
ing vision."59 This vision, Perry explains, entails "a commitment-though
not necessarily a fully conscious commitment-to the notion of moral
evolution,"60 a perceived national duty to attain a "higher law""1 through
a process Perry likens to "prophecy.16 2 It is from this perceived obligation
that Perry derives his justification for noninterpretive judicial review.
To the modern skeptic, this claim may sound a bit mystical. Yet Perry
does not intend to invoke the supernatural. He seeks rather to make the
simple point that we have not defined ourselves as a nation merely by the
interests reflected in representational democracy. To the contrary, our
constitutional charter outlines basic guarantees not only of equality and
political participation, but of individual liberty and autonomy as well.
6
3
Moreover, if we are to attempt to describe the American ethos, as consti-
tutional theorists seem so determined to do, that spirit has historically in-
cluded the notion of moral evolution." Realizing our own fallibility and
the commensurate need to seek a fuller understanding of ourselves and
our fellow citizens, we are willing to look beyond existing political and
moral conventions for new answers.
Having embraced this view, 65 Perry argues that noninterpretive judicial
review in individual rights cases provides a desirable accommodation of
54. C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969).
55. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 59-68 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-43 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
56. A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 177 (1978).
57. M. PERRY at 97.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 99 (emphasis added).
61. Id. at 97.
62. Id. at 98.
63. See Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J.
1063 (1980).
64. See NEW WORLD METAPHYSICS: READINGS ON THE RELIGIOUS MEANING OF THE AMERI-
CAN EXPERIENCE (G. Gunn ed. 1981); R. BELLAH & P. HAMMOND, VARIETIES OF CIVIL RELIGION
(1980).
65. Perry argues that his notion of a binding religious vision reflecting a commitment to moral
evolution is not essential to his functional argument for non-interpretive judicial review. M. PERRY at
100. In a fundamental way, however, the notion is essential to Perry's work. First, he makes a great
effort to establish the proposition-which indicates that he thinks it vital to his thesis. Second, it
appears that Perry ultimately seeks to attack Ely for adopting too narrow a description of our consti-
tutional structure. For Perry, Ely wrongly makes all of our constitutional values participational ones.
Perry argues that we have both democratic interests and interests of moral evolution. To this extent,
therefore, the "religious" argument lies at the heart of Perry's work.
Vol. 93: 171, 1983
Giving Substance Its Due
our twin societal aims of democratic accountability and moral evolution.8
In our system of government, only the judiciary serves as a medium of
moral reevaluation, because the politically accountable branches tend to
deal with political-moral questions by voting the established moral con-
ventions of the majority of their constituents. Perry's argument is there-
fore a functional one. The claimed result of judicial policymaking in the
civil rights area is "a far more self-critical political morality than would
otherwise [exist]."67 Broad constitutional review is justified, therefore, be-
cause we are committed as a people to moral evolution and because we are
able to proceed farther along that path with judicial review than without
it.
The final link in Perry's functional vindication of noninterpretive re-
view is to claim that such review is consistent with principles of electoral
accountability. He bases this conclusion on the "significant political con-
trol" over review that Congress can wield by limiting the jurisdiction of
the federal courts." The Constitution, the Courts, and Human Rights
thus successfully formulates an argument for noninterpretive review that
extends its usefulness beyond process-based values. As discussed in the
final section of this essay, Perry counters both the internal logic and the
ultimate desirability of Ely's arguments in Democracy and Distrust. Yet
Perry's book raises questions of its own.
The tone of Perry's work seems strangely at odds with its content. Bob-
bitt's book is written powerfully, yet subtly. His arguments are under-
stated; his critique, while forceful, is not mean spirited. Perry's style, in
contrast, can fairly be characterized as contentious. Indeed, like a new
gunfighter trying to build a reputation on more established names, Perry
seems bent on attack. The book is replete with statements that "Ely is
wrong,"" "Bork is wrong,"' 70 and "Dworkin is flatly wrong. 7 1 If Perry's
substance calls for charity and moral elevation, his style does not.
Further, the alignment of judicial review with a religious commitment
of the American people to moral evolution is initially disconcerting. A per-
functory review of American history would lead one to conclude that the
depth of our societal commitment to virtue is not substantial. But even
apart from the questionable vigor of our search for virtue, Perry's descrip-
tions of an "American Israel," "beacon to the world," and light of "moral
66. M. PERRY at 102.
67. Id. at 113.
68. Id. at 128.
69. Id. at 24.
70. Id. at 180 n.103.
71. Id. at 75.
The Yale Law Journal
leadership" 2 carry the implication of a unique American commitment to
moral evolution that the rest of the world discards. 8
Perry's primary criticism of theorists such as Ely applies with equal
force to his own work. He claims these analysts "justif[y] the particular
species of constitutional policymaking they want to salvage from an inter-
pretivist attack. . .[yet] at the same time. . . condem[n] species of poli-
cymaking for which they have no sympathy. ' 4 Ely, for example, argues
for activism concerning process-based rights yet disdains judicial review
under the demand for "due substance. ' 75 Like a good liberal, Perry advo-
cates activism in both of these instances, yet deplores it in pursuance of
federalism and separation of powers. Further, if Ely interprets the Consti-
tution as a document replete with representational democracy, Perry
redesigns it as a tool for moral evolution. Perhaps we all theorize in our
own image.
Finally, Perry takes his functional justification for constitutional poli-
cymaking too far. Since his argument for noninterpretive review is essen-
tially that we are more capable of fulfilling the American commitment to
moral evolution with it than without it, the theory is not easily bounded.
It is not dependent upon either the text or the structure of the Constitu-
tion. As a result, Perry claims that the function of a judge in a human
rights case is indistinguishable from that of a legislator facing the same
issue.
The role of a judge called upon to interpret the Constitution, however,
is inescapably distinct from that of a legislator addressing a similar issue.
Unlike a legislator, the judge in a constitutional civil rights case typically
is being asked to overturn the prior decision of another branch of govern-
ment. That distinction can hardly be considered inconsequential. Further,
it seems difficult to disagree with Professor Monaghan's statement that
"the making of constitutional law simply ought not to be like the making
of common law."' 76 While broad interpretive powers in the common law
context can be exercised to further legislative will, judicial policymaking
in the constitutional context thwarts legislative authority.
In addition, equating the role of the constitutional jurist with that of the
72. Id. at 98.
73. As Reinhold Niebuhr wrote decades ago: "[W]e are still inclined to pretend that our power is
exercised by a particularly virtuous nation. The uniqueness of our virtue is questioned by both our
friends and our enemies. All historic virtues and achievements are more ambiguous and fragmentary
than we are inclined to believe." R. NIEBUHR, THE CHILDREN OF LIGr AND THE CHILDREN OF
DARKNESS ix (1960).
74. M. PERRY at 76-77.
75. "Due substance" is actually Professor Monaghan's term. See Monaghan, supra note 20, at
358-59.
76. Id. at 386.
77. See J. ELY, supra note 1, at 68.
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moral philosopher diminishes the importance of the constitutional text.
Implicitly it suggests that hard-won constitutional amendments carry no
more weight than the particular moral speculations of a federal judge. As
Fred Schauer has pointed out: "The authoritative nature of the text, the
existence of a substantive content beyond a mere formal authorization for
judges to philosophize, compels us to reject [the] . . .notion of one-to-one
fusion of constitutional law and moral theory. "78
Perry feels free to argue for constitutional policymaking by the judici-
ary bounded only by the "significant political control" that Congress can
exercise by limiting the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Perry's argument
is similar to a recent suggestion by Charles Black that the Ninth Amend-
ment should be given an expansive substantive interpretation by the fed-
eral courts-again subject to popular control through congressional power
to restrict jurisdiction.79 That power, however, is not free from doubt in
its own right. Were such a "regulation" to be seen, for example, as an
abrogation of an essential function of an independent judiciary, or as
merely a veiled means to accomplish an unconstitutional substantive end,
serious constitutional questions would arise.80
There is also a risk attaching to arguments for judicial activism that
seek to "cure" anti-majoritarian tensions by relying upon congressional
authority to control judicial power. The public in general, and Congress
in particular, might accept only half the equation: A recalcitrant Congress
might reject Perry's claim that the federal courts should support an ac-
tivist human rights agenda but accept his suggestion that the power to
restrict judicial authority is clear.
Further, since Perry conditions noninterpretive judicial review upon the
power to restrict jurisdiction, a Congress adopting his theory would quick-
ly come to see its own silence as accepting a particular exercise of judicial
policymaking. Rhetorical claims of a duty to restrict what the Supreme
Court can decide would soon follow."1 The exceptions clause would not
long remain a shadowy, but largely unemployed, threat to judicial inde-
pendence. Congress would likely second-guess the Court at will.
If the exceptions clause is not thus transposed-as one hopes it will not
be-one would do well to recall that it has not been employed in over one
78. Schauer, An Essay On Constitutional Language, 29 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 797, 813-14 (1982).
79. C. BLACK, DECISION ACCORDING TO LAW 18-19, 38-39, 78-79 (1981).
80. See Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Limits on Congress'
Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARv. L. REv. 17 (1981); Tribe,
Jurisdictional Gerrymandering: Zoning Disfavored Rights Out of the Federal Courts, 16 HARv.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 129 (1981).
81. Professor Van Alstyne makes a similar argument in reviewing Professor Black's book. Van
Alstyne, Slouching Toward Bethlehem with the Ninth Amendment (Book Review), 91 YALE L.J. 207,
214 (1981).
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hundred years.8 2 It thus seems imprudent to make it the linchpin of a
theory of constitutional interpretation. As it is, jurisdictional control
merely permits adherents of judicial activism to deflect claims that judicial
review is inconsistent with democratic principles.
III. THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL AUTHORITY
Both Bobbitt and Perry offer substantial critiques of the works of John
Hart Ely, though only Perry makes such criticism a focal point of his
book. Ely's Democracy and Distrust thus makes an appropriate point of
departure for evaluating the success of Bobbitt's and Perry's arguments.
Ely has argued that noninterpretive review is justifiable only when it
serves to clear "the channels of political change on the one hand. . .[or
to correct] certain kinds of discrimination against minorities on the
other."83 Although process-based or "participational"'84 review is to be en-
couraged, examining the substance of political decisionmaking is beyond
judicial competence.8 5 Perry has no objection, of course, to Ely's embrace
of process-based analysis, but he attacks the distinction between participa-
tional and substantive review as unsupportable.
Perry sees Ely's attempted distinction as based upon two arguments:
first, that a societal consensus supports participational but not substantive
review; and second, that process-based review is supported by the history
and structure of the/ Constitution. The former argument, according to
Perry, fails because consensus breaks down on the fringes of constitutional
analysis. Even if most of us agree, for example, that freedom of speech is
important, there is no similar agreement that a draft resister should be
allowed to wear a jacket displaying "fuck the draft."8 6 Ely's second argu-
ment is unacceptable to Perry because it enforces a theory of representa-
tive democracy that Ely infers from our constitutional structure rather
than from the theories actually expressed in the text.8
Attacking Ely from a different direction, Bobbitt argues that Ely is mis-
guided in attempting to provide a single, axiomatic foundation for consti-
82. The two cases treating Congress's powers under the exceptions clause are Ex pare McCardle,
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869), in which the Court acceded to a deprivation of jurisdiction over habeas
corpus appeals, and United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871), in which the Court held
that Congress could not eliminate the Court's jurisdiction over the property claims of unreconstructed
southerners in order to control the results in a particular case.
83. J. ELY, supra note 1, at 74.
84. Id. "Participational" review, referring to judicial review designed to assure the litigant's par-
ticipation in the political or social process, should be distinguished from Bobbitt's use of the term
"participatory constitution." Bobbitt refers to the broad spectrum of participation in the process of
constitutional decision-making.
85. Id. at 43-72, 116-25.
86. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
87. M. PERRY at 90.
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tutional review-the promotion of representative democracy. Such an ef-
fort, argues Bobbitt, fails to recognize that judicial review appropriately
performs a variety of functions in our system of government. Instead, Ely
attempts to derive a doctrine justifying review from a single element of its
practice:
Impressed by a certain feature of the Constitution, the contemporary
critic makes that feature a model for the description of all Constitu-
tional law. This accounts for the current interest in the celebrated
Carolene Products footnote. It is the result of recognizing a form of
Constitutional argument but, at the same time, being trapped within
it and declaring this perspective to be the only legitimate one.88
Bobbitt's critique of Ely's work hints at the important features of Con-
stitutional Fate and The Constitution, the Courts, and Human Rights.
Both books are reactions against the recent scholarly trend seeking to nar-
row the scope of constitutional law. Each author convincingly argues that
process-based theories undervalue vital aspects of constitutional adjudica-
tion. Perry argues that a strict Carolene Products' footnote-four theory of
judicial power is not only internally inconsistent, but also silences the
most effective institutional voice in the American dialogue of moral evolu-
tion. Bobbitt suggests that although there have been occasions when ethi-
cal argument was used as a trump by a particular political faction, our
constitutional charter is both a guarantee of political access and a docu-
ment of personal liberty. Current proposals to ignore unspecified personal
rights would therefore do violence to the "constitutional ethos that every
[jurist] has internalized."8"
The appeal of limited theories of judicial review, of course, is that they
attempt the "development of [a] constitutional theory, which could serve
as a constraint on judges by providing some standard, distinct from mere
disapproval of results, by which their performance could be evaluated." 9 0
Yet the abandonment of all non-ttxtual substantive constitutional protec-
tion is a high price to pay for containment of the Justices. It is not only
friction with other branches of government that threatens the institutional
capital of our highest court. The passivity of the Vinson Court, for exam-
ple, may have harmed the standing of the United States Supreme Court
more than did the activism of its successor.
Moreover, restrictive theories of judicial review appear to presume that
by employing the proper formula we can eliminate the subjectivity, uncer-
88. P. BOBBrrr at 247.
89. Id. at 147.
90. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivirn and Neutral Prind-
pies, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 784 (1983).
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tainty, and moral responsibility inherent in modern constitutional review.
American constitutional scholarship seems plagued by a desire to avoid
the accountability that is a necessary component of political-moral deci-
sionmaking. One cannot shun responsibility by claiming that "one stands
by the Constitution and that, in turn, the Constitution itself stands for the
proper values."91 Unless one advocates "an extraordinarily radical purge
of established constitutional doctrine,"9 2 and perhaps the discarding of ju-
dicial review itself, the claim that one stands by the Constitution is
hollow.9"
Participational theories, as Perry reveals, reflect their authors' views of
the appropriate characteristics of representational democracy, rather than
any set features embodied in the Constitution. Even "pure" interpretivist,
or textual review, must hinge on the very noninterpretivist premises of
Marbury v. Madison94-a fact that must provide little consolation to any
"strict constructionist." Claiming strict allegiance to the Constitution, or
to the representational values "implicit" in it, does not allow us to escape
the responsibilities inherent in the development of a constitutional juris-
prudence for present and future generations.
Nor can we render the enterprise entirely predictable. Much of modern
constitutional theory seeks to tidy up the potentially unruly features of
constitutional adjudication. Scholars fret-not always unreasonably-over
the placement of broad substantive powers in the hands of federal judges.
As a result, they labor mightily to remove both doubt and danger from the
U.S. Reports. Theorists such as Ely search for the "one and only truth
about the Constitution."9 5 But certainty, as Justice Holmes commented,
"is illusion, and repose is not the destiny of mankind."' Nor, we have
learned, can it be the cornerstone of American constitutional law.'
7
Bobbitt and Perry successfully resist this tendency in constitutional the-
ory. Both willingly accept that there is neither one true meaning of the
Constitution nor one purpose which informs judicial review. Rather, con-
stitutional adjudication is a meandering process by which we seek to as-
91. See Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEx. L. REv. 373, 400 (1982).
92. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REv. 703, 713 (1975).
93. A pure interpretivist must, for example, reject almost the entire body of law developed under
the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the incorporation of the Bill of
Rights, the desegregation decisions, the prohibition against gender discrimination, and the equal pro-
tection requirements enforceable against the federal government. Id. at 710-13. Indeed, judicial re-
view itself is not clearly justified under "pure" interpretivism.
94. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803); see Nichol, Standing On the Constitution: The Supreme
Court and Valley Forge, 61 N.C.L. REv. 798 (1983).
95. Levinson, supra note 91, at 380.
96. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 466 (1897).
97. "Of course, our craving for certainty may cause us to search for the immutable. This is most
apparent in law, where the myth of certainty has a persistent appeal. But the law cannot be certain,
in large part because language itself is not certain." Schauer, supra note 78, at 831-32.
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sure political and social equality, to etch out those freedoms secured to
autonomous individuals, and to define and express ourselves as a society.
With such an ambitious agenda, judicial review will never be smooth and
uncontroversial.
A free society, as Niebuhr observed, requires confidence in "the ability
of men to reach tentative and tolerable adjustments between their compet-
ing interests and to arrive at some common notions of justice which tran-
scend all partial interests."9 8 Constitutional Fate and The Constitution,
the Courts, and Human Rights are significant jurisprudential works be-
cause they spring from such confidence. Neither book is without internal
inconsistencies, and neither provides a tidy theory with which to cabin
wayward Supreme Court Justices. Yet Perry reveals the importance of the
role the judiciary can play amid our stumbling steps toward self-improve-
ment, and Bobbitt attempts to put flesh on a constitutional ethos that may
be the strongest feature of our national character. If perfect consistency
and containment require the forfeiture of those two values, they may not
be worth the price.
98. R. NIEBUHR, supra note 73, at xii.
The SEC: A New American Institution
The Transformation of Wall Street: A History of the Securities and
Exchange Commission and Modern Corporate Finance. By Joel
Seligman. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1982. Pp. xv, 701.
$27.50.
John Wheeler4
The Transformation of Wall Street1 subtly reveals that the Securities
and Exchange Commission has fully become an American institution.
Through its persistent adherence to certain fundamental values and its
ability to attract high-quality staff attorneys and commissioners, the SEC
has greatly influenced Wall Street during crises of confidence and chang-
ing technology. Like the New York Times or the law schools at Harvard2
and Yale, the SEC is an organization of unusual power, longevity, and
responsibility.
By showing that the SEC has become an institution in this special sense
and by giving readers the "feel" of the professional life and attitudes
within the Commission, Professor Seligman's book earns its place in the
library of both practitioners and academics. The securities lawyer will
gain a better sense of how the SEC handles rulemaking, enforcement, and
securities registration,' while the academic will have a better idea of how
government can be a leading force in a complex and constantly changing
field.
t Special Counsel to the Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission. Member, District of
Columbia Bar. B.S., United States Military Academy, 1966; M.B.A., Harvard University, 1969;
J.D., Yale University, 1975. The Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, dis-
claims responsibility for any private publication or statement by any of its employees. The views
expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or
of the author's colleagues within the Commission.
In the spirit of full disclosure, the author states that he has served five years at the Commission, as
Assistant General Counsel, Special Counsel to the Director of the Division of Corporation Finance
(Edward F. Greene), and Legal Assistant to Commissioner Roberta S. Karmel.
1. J. SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET (1982) [hereinafter cited by page
number only].
2. Professor Seligman has previously examined the influence of the Harvard Law School. See J.
SELIGMAN, THE HIGH CITADEL: THE INFLUENCE OF HARVARD LAW SCHOOL (1978).
3. Firms practicing in these areas may wish to purchase R. KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECU-
TION: THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION VS. CORPORATE AMERICA (1982), as a com-
plement to Seligman's book. Ms. Karmel focuses on the post-1976 period, while Professor Seligman
concentrates on the years from 1932 to 1976.
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I.
An organization must persist if it is to become an institution. May 27,
1983, marked the fiftieth anniversary of the passage of the Securities Act
of 1933;4 June 6, 1984, will be the fiftieth anniversary of the passage of
the Securities Exchange Act of 19341 and the SEC's birth.' Fifty years is
a long time in a world of rapid social and technological change. Certainly
some of the SEC's cohorts from the New Deal have fared less well.7 Still,
Professor Seligman emphasizes the SEC's present institutional strength by
recounting its past so completely. Indeed, the book could not be more com-
plete without becoming unwieldy. The body of the book is a thorough,
chronological recountal of the SEC's history, supported by 108 pages of
endnotes. Professor Seligman also includes a 23-page index, a superb fact-
finder. The one-page table of contents, however, could use amplification.
In addition, some of the chapters are so long (Chapter 10 is 58 pages and
Chapter 12 is 129 pages) that interspersed headnotes would help the
reader navigate through the book. Because the book is laid out chronologi-
cally, topical headnotes would be of special help.
While some may disagree with Seligman's conclusions,8 none would
doubt his scholarship.9 Seligman has carefully documented the SEC's im-
pressive history. The past alone argues that the SEC has become an im-
portant American institution. The true measure of the SEC's success,
however, goes beyond this fifty-year history.
4. Ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1976 & Supp. V
1981)).
5. Ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976 & Supp. V
1981)).
6. The SEC was established by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 4, 48 Stat. 881,
885 (1934) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 78d (1976)).
7. The Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall Act), ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified in scat-
tered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C. (1976)), is undergoing major reexamination. See Noble,
Safe 6 of Deregulation of Banking is Debated, N.Y. Times, July 18, 1983, at Dl, col. 1. It has been
eroded by mergers and advances in technology that allow broker-dealers and investment bankers, on
the one hand, and commercial banks, on the other, to encroach further into each other's traditional
markets. Id. at D8, col. 3. Congress has decided to phase out the Civil Aeronautics Board. See Feaver,
Inside the CAB, Washington Post, July 15, 1983, at A23, col. 1.
8. See Kerr, Book Review, 38 REC. A.B. Crry N.Y. 151,151-58 (Mar. 1983) (claiming Seligman
overly critical of SEC).
9. See Longstreth, Book Review, 83 COLUM. L. REv. (forthcoming Oct. 1983) (SEC Commis-
sioner stating that Professor Seligman is at his "scholarly best, displaying the strengths of a meticu-
lous historian"). In the course of research on early SEC history, I cite-checked many of the notes of
Seligman's early chapters and found them flawless. His history of the 1970's comports with my un-
derstanding from my tour on the staff. Moreover, the book is not only soundly researched and docu-
mented, but clearly distinguishes the author's opinion from his recital of facts.
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II.
A truly public institution must stand for widely shared values. Profes-
sor Seligman captures the underlying values of the SEC by quoting Presi-
dent Roosevelt on the purpose of the 1933 Act: "[It] adds to the ancient
rule of caveat emptor the further doctrine: 'Let the seller also beware.' It
puts the burden of telling the whole truth on the seller. It should give
impetus to honest dealing in securities and thereby bring back public con-
fidence."' 0 The 1933 Act applied this simple philosophy to the public sale
of securities by the issuing companies;"' the 1934 Act applied it to those
companies' subsequent periodic reporting,"2 and established direct re-
straints and inspections on certain stock market activities."8
The heart of the SEC's work has thus always been to assure that public
companies issuing securities tell the truth about themselves, that they keep
telling the truth, and that the people trading those securities are utterly
honest and fair. The objective is integrity. Compared to the work of other
agencies, the SEC engages in little direct regulation of business affairs.'
4
Its goals and its actions are therefore easy for the public to grasp and
support. Indeed, the SEC makes an occasional appearance in popular cul-
ture,' 5 and its activities are frequently covered in the press." The series of
major legislative enactments that have both deepened and broadened SEC
jurisdiction also indicate that the Commission's purposes reflect important
societal values. Professor Seligman details the controversies surrounding
the original 1933-34 legislation," the 1964 securities acts amendments ex-
tending reporting obligations to a broader class of issuers,"8 and the 1975
amendments vesting the Commission with authority to integrate and auto-
mate securities trading into a national market system.' Seligman's full
accounts of the political give-and-take preceding each enactment allow the
10. Pp. 53-54.
11. Ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1976 & Supp.
V 1981)).
12. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 13, 48 Stat. 881, 894-95 (1934) (current version
at 15 U.S.C. § 7 8m (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
13. Id. § 17, 48 Stat. at 897 (1934) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 7 8 q (1976)) (inspections by
SEC).
14. Lloyd Cutler has pointed out that this precise and narrow mission is an important reason why
the SEC has endured as a strong agency. L. Cutler, Remarks at the SEC Awards Ceremony (Nov.
21, 1979).
15. In a recent episode of the soap opera spoof, "Soap," a businessman's spurned mistress "turned
him in to the SEC" for double-dealing in stocks. And in the movie Being There, the protagonist at one
point counsels caution lest there "be a call from some kid lawyer at the SEC."
16. Seligman's thorough footnotes show a half-century of press coverage of the SEC. See pp.
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reader to gauge the changing attitudes of Congress and the executive
branch toward the Commission.
Another key indicator of societal support for the ideals underlying the
securities laws is the private right of action for violations of the securities
laws. Currently only a small number of federal civil securities cases in-
clude the SEC as a party.20 The effect of SEC-established precedents,
however, is greatly magnified through their use by private parties.' 1
III.
To become a true institution, an organization must do more than en-
dure and promulgate widely held values. It must also be effective in
achieving its goals. That effectiveness requires high-quality personnel and
an institutional ability to adapt to changing circumstances. The most elo-
quent part of Professor Seligman's story is his portrait of the leaders of
the SEC. Individuals play an important role in building any institution,
especially one as small as the SEC.'2 "'The greatest immediate need,'
Frankfurter would write Walter Lippmann while lobbying for the 1933
Securities Act, is 'qualified men for key jobs. '""23 Similarly, in the 1934
House Stock Exchange Practices Hearings, another early leader of the
SEC emphasized the importance of a good staff:
MR. MAPES. The law ought to be made to apply to all alike and I
hate the idea that some man can go to an administrative official and
get something done that another fellow on the street cannot.
MR. CORCORAN. You have to have the power to make rules and
regulations in every administrative body. The answer is to pick good
men on your commissions.
MR. MAPES. Well, that sometimes is no answer at all.
MR. CORCORAN. It is the ultimate answer to any governmental
problem."'
The Commission has attracted good men-and now, most certainly, good
women. The Transfornation of Wall Street relates how successive genera-
tions of able advisors, staffers, and commissioners have worked at the
SEC, starting with Frankfurter proteges James Landis, Benjamin Cohen,
20. See REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES AND REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 217
(1982) (Table C-2) (only 178 of 2376 "securities, commodities and exchanges" cases commenced in
district courts in 1982 involved U.S. as a party).
21. See R. KARMEL, supra note 3, at 193-96 (discussing implied private remedies).
22. The SEC staff has never numbered much over 2000, nor has it grown much-it was just over
1700 in 1941. P. 267; SEC 1982 ANN. REP. 134 (1982) (Table 42).
23. P. 61.
24. P. 101.
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and Thomas Corcoran, and continuing with such people as Joseph Ken-
nedy, William Douglas, Louis Loss, Milton Cohen, William Cary, Ma-
nuel Cohen, Irving Pollack, and Stanley Sporkin.
The efforts of these leaders and those under them have not gone unno-
ticed. Time magazine reported in 1935 that the SEC had "won the dis-
tinction of being the most ably administered New Deal agency in Wash-
ington; ' 25 in 1949, the Commission staff was singled out for praise by the
Hoover Commission;2" in 1976, a major congressional survey reported
that the SEC was the best of the independent agencies;27 and in 1982, the
Heritage Foundation wrote that the staff of the SEC is "among the best
and brightest in the government . ". .."8
The SEC's small size and early leadership by Kennedy, Landis, and
Douglas has given it an esprit that endures, passed from one season of
staffers and commissioners to another. This is the lifeblood of institutions;
I have witnessed the same effect at Yale Law School, West Point,
Harvard Business School, and among close friends who have been
Marines. In the 1980's, references to esprit, leadership, and to these exact
examples may not be fashionable, but one cannot help thinking of these
comparisons as Professor Seligman's chronicle unfolds. It is first of all a
chronicle of able people working well together.
Two important points not directly addressed by Professor Seligman, but
plain in his book, are the impact of former staffers upon the private bar
and the consistent jurisprudential tension in the SEC's life between what
might be called the "Frankfurter wing" and the "Douglas wing." Frank-
furter and Douglas were both brilliant, activist scholars, but there is a
difference in the tenor of their jurisprudence. Frankfurter tended toward
thoroughness, Douglas toward celerity. The traits represented by both dy-
namic men are evident throughout the Commission's life.
Douglas, the third Chairman of the SEC, was "the man who got things
done."2 9 It was Douglas who inspired and fielded the early corps of Com-
mission attorneys.
Douglas led the SEC on a crusade that attempted to complete the
Commission's logical mandate by consolidating SEC enforcement of
the over-the-counter markets, commencing enforcement of the geo-
25. P. 116.
26. U.S. COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT,
TASK FORCE REPORT ON REGULATORY COMMISSIONS app. N at 144 (1949).
27. See FEDERAL REGULATION AND REGULATORY REFORM: REPORT BY THE SUBCOMM. ON
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COM-
MERCE 94TH CONG., 2D SESs. 11-12 (1976); Aug, Regulatory Agency Rating List: SEC 1st, FPC in
the Cellar, Washington Star, Oct. 4, 1976, at A3, col. 5.
28. THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, AGENDA '83, at 313 (1983). The Heritage Foundation
nonetheless criticized the SEC for constantly reinterpreting its "open-ended statutes." Id.
29. The phrase is the title of the book's sixth chapter. P. 156.
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graphic integration and corporate simplification provisions of the
Public Utility Holding Company Act, and replacing state standards
of corporate finance, accounting, and corporate governance with
SEC-enforced federal rules. No other SEC chairman ever addressed
so many fundamental problems simultaneously. Not all of Douglas's
initiatives succeeded. But his chairmanship was the most accom-
plished in the SEC's history, in part because it articulated a coherent
policy framework for federal corporations law that was to guide the
next two generations of corporate reform efforts."0
The Douglas tradition has strong ties to Yale Law School. Douglas
went to the SEC from his teaching post at Yale. There, Douglas was
closely associated with Jerome Frank, the fourth SEC Chairman and, ac-
cording to Abe Fortas, a "spark plug" of the New Deal. 1 The energetic
Sporkin, author of the famous 1970's corporate foreign payments investi-
gations," is also an alumnus of Yale Law School.
In the expansive tradition of Douglas, Manuel Cohen was Chairman
from 1964 to 1969, Irving Pollack was Commissioner from 1974 to 1980,
and Stanley Sporkin was Enforcement Director from 1974 to 1981.
Sporkin and Pollack were deeply influenced by Cohen, whose tenure at
the Commission since 1942 unquestionably made him, as Irving Pollkck
wrote, "Mr. SEC.""3 Cohen was "one of the most activist SEC chairmen




Frankfurter, the intellectual sire of the 1933 and 1934 Acts, 5 was by
contrast more thorough and less expansionist. His approach to running
the Commission mirrored his jurisprudence and his philosophy:
The staples of contemporary politics-the organization of industry,
the course of public utilities, the well-being of agriculture, the mas-
tery of crime and disease-are deeply enmeshed in intricate and
technical facts, and must be extricated from presupposition and par-
tisanship. Such matters require systematic effort to contract the area
of conflict and passion and widen the area of accredited knowledge
as the basis of action.3"
30. Pp. 156-57.
31. P. 214.
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The roots of this tradition run to Harvard Law School. Chairman Lan-
dis, trained at Harvard and Frankfurter's prot~g6, 8" was indefatigably
thorough in his Commission work:
The hallmark of his chairmanship would be an insistence on the
technical competence of the Commission. His were the virtues com-
mended by the Harvard Law Review: insistence that technical issues
be empirically studied on a case-by-case basis rather than be resolved
by reference to general moral or ethical principles; insistence that no
administrative proposal be made until the agency thoroughly under-
stood its practical consequences; insistence that no action be taken by
the agency that could not survive review by the then-hostile Supreme
Court. 8
In the Frankfurter tradition, Landis was Chairman from 1935 to 1937,
William Cary was Chairman from 1961 to 1964, and Roberta Karmel
was Commissioner from 1977 to 1980. Though Cary studied under
Douglas, he often quoted Karl Llewellyn: "Technique without ideals is a
menace; ideals without technique are a mess." 9 As Seligman points out,
Douglas and Frank considered themselves involved in a political reform
movement, while Cary "'felt it important to behave like a lawyer.
' '40
Roberta Karmel, who joined the SEC staff during Cary's chairman-
ship, has asserted that the crusading SEC of the 1970's needs to return to
technical rigor in bringing cases to trial, to questions of jurisdictional
bounds, and to fairness to persons who are under investigation.41 She
points out that in the 1970's "prosecutorial zeal blinded the Commission
to legal and political reality," giving rise to reversals (and damaged credi-
bility as a litigant) in the Supreme Court."'
Of course, staffers and commissioners are not always wholly of one
"wing" or another. Manuel Cohen began his chairmanship with a moder-
ate approach, and his attention to technical and administrative detail are
legendary.43 Cary was "a determined reformer."
44
Seligman's conclusion that the SEC has seldom been expansionist
enough 5 puts him in the Douglas wing. This is perhaps unsurprising





41. R. KARMEL, supra note 3, at 17, 226-29.
42. Id. at 190.
43. Pp. 356-57.
44. P. 293.
45. See, e.g., pp. 328-35, 437, 534-35, 545.
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Accountability Research Group as co-author of Taming the Giant
Corporation.4
Because so many SEC staffers and commissioners enter the private bar,
the ranks of practitioners are influenced by these two philosophies of se-
curities jurisprudence. The average attorney's and commissioner's tour in
the SEC is under five years. This phenomenon increases the SEC's in-
fluence by creating a significant flow of attorneys, trained in the Commis-
sion tradition and imbued with its institutional attitudes, into private
practice.
4 7
The Transformation of Wall Street essentially ends its history of the
SEC in the winter of 1976-77. 48 It therefore understandably omits a sig-
nificant new strength of the SEC: the emergence of women as principals
in the agency, co-equal with men. I know of no other agency, law firm, or
business where the equal status of able women and men is more advanced
or more gladly accepted. 4 ' This phenomenon evidences the SEC's tradi-
tional first appreciation of professional excellence-the common ground of
the Douglas and Frankfurter wings.
It is during conflict when an institution's people must work well to-
gether. Seligman's recounting of the conflicts involving the SEC are the
most stirring parts of the book. The detailed history of the drafting and
passage of the 1933 and 1934 Acts reads like a novel.50 It is as well a
valuable primer for anyone likely to enter the legislative fray in Washing-
ton, as is the tale of the passage of the 1964 securities acts amendments.5"
Seligman describes the American public-utility industry's complete reor-
ganization and the implementation and defense of the SEC's legislative
mandates; he thereby shows the fighting ability of the SEC's staff and
commissioners during its first twenty years.5"
46. R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION (1976).
47. The SEC averaged between 600 and 700 lawyers during the period, with turnover of between
100 and 200 per year. Total turnover would thus be at least 1000 in ten years, and the average tour
under five years.
48. The book does include some later material on the SEC's policy towards corporate earnings
projections, pp. 559-61, and the development of a national market system, pp. 527-34.
49. There have recently been two female Commissioners, Roberta Karmel and Barbara Thomas.
Kathryn McGrath heads the Division of Investment Management. Myrna Siegel holds the sensitive
post of Ethics Counsel to the Commission and staff. Associate General Counsel Linda Fienberg heads
much of the SEC's litigation, and Alexia Morrison is Chief Litigation Counsel in Enforcement. In the
Division of Corporation Finance, Associate Directors Linda Quinn and Mary E.T. Beach, Deputy
Associate Director Amy Goodman, and Operating Procedures Chief Ernestine Zipoy are principal
policymakers. Linda Griggs is Chief Counsel in the Office of the Chief Accountant and Ethel Geis-
inger directs legislative liason.
50. See, e.g., pp. 63-64, 73-74, 96-97.
51. Pp. 310-23.
52. See pp. 131-38, 218-22 (discussion of public-utility industry reorganization); p. 169 (discus-
sion of Douglas's role in Richard Whitney scandal).
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IV.
To remain effective, an organization requires sufficient flexibility to en-
able it to change with its society. Seligman ably recounts the vision of the
SEC's leaders from its inception through the 1970's.53 Less obviously,
change requires thoughtful criticism, and through Professor Seligman's
study we see that the SEC has benefited from an insightful securities bar
which has assured continuing suggestions from the media, the White
House, and Congress on how the Commission could improve its work.
Current developments suggest the same capacity for change: the emer-
gence of a balance of women leaders in the Commission," the accord with
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission to coordinate regulation of
the commodities and securities markets, the accord with the Swiss govern-
ment facilitating access, to information on Swiss accounts used to launder
or hide funds in securities frauds, the pending legislation for treble penal-
ties in insider trading cases, the Commission's initiatives in supporting the
Vice President's Task Group on regulation of the financial sector, the
Commission's tender-offer advisory committee, the reorganization of fil-
ings review, and the integration of the reporting requirements for the
1933 and 1934 Acts.55
The breadth of these issues demonstrates that the SEC will continue to
have an important mission in a rapidly changing financial community."
Perhaps no issue is as crucial as the increasing impact of new informa-
tional technologies. The rapid spread of computer terminals is bringing
the disclosure theory of the 1933 and 1934 Acts to full and thorough real-
ity.57 Having transformed Wall Street from the grist of the scandal sheets
53. See, e.g., pp. 290-97 (Gary), 444-45 (Casey), 449 (Garrett).
54. See supra note 49.
55. For a description of all these developments, see SEC 1982 ANN. REP., supra note 22, at
iii-viii, xvi-xxi; Special Report, SEC Advisory Committee on Tender Offers (special FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) pamphlet No. 1028, July 15, 1983).
56. George Benston, among others, has challenged the need for legislatively mandated disclosure.
Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 63 AMER. ECON. REV. 132 (1973). Seligman sharply criticizes Benston:
Benston's suggestion that there was little securities fraud before 1934 was ludicrous. His
"search of the available literature" apparently did not lead him to read of a single enforcement
action brought by any of the forty-seven states that enacted blue sky securities regulation laws
between 1911 and 1933. Yet in the year 1932, the State of New York alone secured injunc-
tions against 1522 persons and firms and instituted 146 criminal actions . . . . [Benston also
failed to] analyze the significance of the Post Office Department's pre-1934 securities fraud
enforcement actions, common law securities fraud enforcement actions, common law securities
fraud civil cases, or even such notorious events as the Pecora hearings' revelations of the mate-
rial factual omissions in the National City Company's Peruvian bond sales.
P. 565 & n.*.
57. One might describe as "history shock" the full implementation of the historical ideals of the
1933 and 1934 Acts made possible by new computer technologies. All material information about
most public companies is known and accessible to the vast majority of investors with increasing rapid-
ity. The same innovations make possible highly individualized fund management allowing brokerage
houses, mutual funds, savings and loan institutions, banks, and insurance companies to compete with
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to the hub of a reliable national market system, the SEC must now deal
with the next generation of challenges. One hopes that Seligman will
someday choose to chronicle these developments as well.
one another. The impact of new informational technologies is explored more thoroughly in Wheeler,
Securities Law Practice in the 1980s-An Appraisal, 9 SEC. REG. L.J. 3 (1981).
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